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Abstract
Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) is arguably the most well-known and widely
used assignment rule. Although it returns an ex post efficient assignment, Bo-
gomolnaia and Moulin (A new solution to the random assignment problem, J.
Econ. Theory 100, 295–328) proved that RSD may not be SD-efficient (efficient
with respect stochastic dominance). The result raises the following question:
under what conditions is RSD not SD-efficient? In this comment, we give a
detailed argument that the RSD assignment is not SD-efficient if and only if an
ex post assignment exists that is not SD-efficient. Hence RSD can be viewed
as being inherently averse to SD-efficiency. The characterization was proved by
Manea (2009).
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1. Introduction
Consider the assignment problem in which n agents expresses linear orders
over n objects and each agent is to be allocated one object [2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 11,
12]. The most famous mechanism for the problem is random serial dictatorship
(RSD) [4, 6]. In RSD, a permutation of the agents is chosen uniformly at
random and then agents in the permutation are given the most preferred object
that is still not allocated. The reason RSD is a compelling mechanism for
the assignment problem is because it is strategyproof and also ex post efficient
(the outcome can be represented as convex combination of deterministic Pareto
optimal outcomes). In fact, it has even been conjectured that RSD is the only
mechanism that satisfies anonymity, strategyproofness and ex post efficiency [see
e.g., 9].
Although RSD is a desirable mechanism, Bogomolnaia and Moulin [6]
showed that RSD is not SD-efficient (efficiency with respect to stochastic dom-
inance).1 The observation was surprising because SD-efficiency is a very unde-
manding property. To highlight this point, note that if an assignment is not
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1Bogomolnaia and Moulin [6] used the term ordinal efficiency for SD-efficient. Bogomolnaia
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SD-efficient, then there exists another assignment in which for all cardinal util-
ities consistent with the ordinal preferences, all agents get at least as much
utility and one agent gets strictly more utility. In this note, we explore the lack
of SD-efficiency of RSD and present an elemetary and detailed argument for the
following theorem.
Theorem (Proposition 3 of Manea [10]). For a given preference profile, the RSD
assignment is not SD-efficient if and only if there exists an ex post assignment
that is not SD-efficient.
The theorem highlights the fact not only is RSD SD-inefficient in general
but is never SD–efficient if there some ex post efficient assignment is not SD-
efficient.
2. Preliminaries
The model we consider is the random assignment problem [6] which is a
triple (N,O,≻) where N is the set of n agents {1, . . . , n}, O = {o1, . . . , on} is
the set of objects, and ≻= (≻1, . . . ,≻n) specifies complete, anti-symmetric and
transitive preferences ≻i of agent i over O. We will denote by R(O) as the set
of all complete and transitive relations over the set of objects O.
A random assignment p is a n × n matrix [p(i)(oj)]1≤i≤n,1≤j≤n such that
for all i ∈ N , and oj ∈ O, p(i)(oj) ∈ [0, 1];
∑
i∈N p(i)(oj) = 1 for all
j ∈ {1, . . . , n}; and
∑
oj∈O
p(i)(oj) = 1 for all i ∈ N . The value p(i)(oj)
represents the probability of object oj being allocated to agent i. Each row
p(i) = (p(i)(o1), . . . , p(i)(on)) represents the allocation of agent i. The set of
columns correspond to probability vectors of the objects o1, . . . , on. A feasible
random assignment is discrete if p(i)(o) ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ N and o ∈ O. A
discrete Pareto optimal assignment p is Pareto optimal if there does not exists
another Pareto optimal assignment q such that each agent gets the same or
more preferred object in q and at least one agent gets a more preferred object
in q.
In order to reason about preferences over random allocations, we extend
preferences over objects to preferences over random allocations. One standard
extension is SD (stochastic dominance) Given two random assignments p and q,
it holds that p(i) %SDi q(i) i.e., a player i SD prefers allocation p(i) to allocation
q(i) if for all o ∈ O.
∑
oj∈{ok:ok%io}
p(i)(oj) ≥
∑
oj∈{ok:ok%io}
q(i)(oj).
An assignment p is SD-efficient is there exists no assignment q such that
q(i) %SDi p(i) for all i ∈ N and q(i) ≻
SD
i p(i) for some i ∈ N . An assignment
and Moulin [6] also presented the probabilistic serial mechanism that is SD-efficient. However,
the mechanism is not stratefyproof.
2
is ex post efficient if it can be represented as a probability distribution over the
set of SD-efficient discrete assignments.
Serial dictatorship (also called priority) is defined as follows. Each agent
in permutation pi of N gets a turn according to the permutation. When an
agent’s turn comes, the agent is allocated the most preferred object that is not
yet allocated. The outcome of serial dictatorship is a deterministic assignment.
We will refer to the outcome of serial dictatorship with respect to permutation
pi as Prio(N,A,≻, pi).
RSD is a random assignment rule in which a permutation of agents is chosen
uniformly at random and then serial dictatorship is run with respect to the
permutation [1, 6, 4]:
RSD(N,O,≻) =
∑
pi∈ΠN
1
n!
(Prio(N,A,≻, pi))
where ΠN denote the set of all permutations of N .
We say a random assignment p is a proper convex combination of a set of
assignments B if p can be represented as a convex combination of assignments in
B such that the weight of each assignment in B is non-zero. Note that the RSD
assignment is a proper convex combination of the serial dictatorship outcomes.
Example 1. Consider an assignment problem in which N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, O =
{o1, o2, o3, o4} and the preferences ≻ are as follows.
2
1 : o1, o2, o3, o4 3 : o2, o1, o4, o3
2 : o1, o2, o3, o4 4 : o2, o1, o4, o3
Prio(N,O,≻, 1234) =


1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0

 , RSD(N,O,≻) =


5/12 1/12 5/12 1/12
5/12 1/12 5/12 1/12
1/12 5/12 1/12 5/12
1/12 5/12 1/12 5/12

 .
In the RSD assignment, the probability of agent 1 getting o1 is 5/12.
3. Inefficiency of RSD
Before we proceed, we present a characterization of SD-efficiency [Lemma
3, 6]. An assignment p admits a trading cycle o0, i0, o1, i1, . . . , ok−1, ik−1, o0 in
which p(ij)(oj) > 0 for all j ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}, oj+1 mod k ≻j oj mod k for all
j ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}. Bogomolnaia and Moulin [6] proved that an assignment is
SD-efficient if and only if it does not admit a trading cycle.
Fact 1 (Bogomolnaia and Moulin [6]). An assignment is SD-efficient if and
only if it does not admit a trading cycle.
2The profile in this example is the same one that was used by Bogomolnaia and Moulin
[6] to show that the RSD outcome is not SD-efficient.
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We will also use the following characterization of Pareto optimal discrete
assignments [1]. Fact 2 also follows from Proposition 1 by Brams and King [7].
Fact 2 (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez [1]). A discrete assignment is Pareto op-
timal if and only if it is an outcome of serial dictatorship.
We first present a simple lemma.
Lemma 1. Consider any assignment p that is a proper convex combination of
all discrete Pareto optimal assignments. Then p(i)(o) > 0 if there exists some
Pareto optimal discrete assignment q such that q(i)(o) > 0.
Proof. Assume that there exists some Pareto optimal discrete assignment q
such that q(i)(o) > 0. Since q has non-zero probability when r is expressed
as a convex combination of discrete Pareto optimal assignments, it follows that
q(i)(o) > 0.
Next, we rely on Lemma 1 and Fact 1 to prove the following.
Lemma 2. For a given preference profile, if there exists a random assignment
that is ex post efficient but not SD-efficient, then a proper convex combination
of all Pareto optimal deterministic assignments is such a random assignment as
well.
Proof. Assume that there exists some assignment s that is ex post but not SD
efficient. Consider any assignment p that is a proper convex combination of all
discrete Pareto optimal assignments. We will show that p is not SD-efficient.
Since s is ex post efficient, it can be represented by a convex combination
of Pareto optimal discrete assignments. Let the set be B. Since s is not SD-
efficient, by Fact 1, it admits a trading cycle o0, i0, o1, i1, . . . , ok−1, ik−1, o0 in
which s(ij)(oj) > 0 for all j ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}, oj+1 mod k ≻j oj mod k for all
j ∈ {0, . . . , k− 1}. Since s is ex post efficient, it can be represented as a convex
combination of Pareto optimal assignments. Therefore if s(ij)(oj) > 0, then
there exist some discrete Pareto optimal assignment r such that r(ij)(oj) > 0.
As p is proper convex combination of all discrete Pareto optimal assignments, if
there exists a discrete assignment r such that r(ij)(oj) > 0, then by Lemma 1,
p(ij)(oj) > 0 for all j ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}. By this argument, it follows that p
admits a trading cycle o0, i0, o1, i1, . . . , ok−1, ik−1, o0 in which p(ij)(oj) > 0 for
all j ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}, oj+1 mod k ≻j oj mod k for all j ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}. Hence
p is not SD-efficient.
Next, we use Fact 2 to prove the following.
Lemma 3. The outcome of RSD is a proper convex combination of all Pareto
optimal deterministic assignments.
Proof. RSD can be viewed as applying serial dictatorship with respect to all
the n! permutations and then aggregating each of the outcomes weighted with
the probability 1/n! By Fact 2, each discrete Pareto optimal assignment is a
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result of serial dictatorship with respect to some permutation. Hence the RSD
assignment is a proper convex combination of all Pareto optimal deterministic
assignments.
By using Lemmas 2 and 3, we can get the following statement.
Theorem (Manea [10]). For a given preference profile, the RSD assignment
is not SD-efficient if and only if there exists an ex post assignment that is not
SD-efficient.
Proof. First assume that for the given preference profile, every ex post assign-
ment is SD-efficient. Since the RSD assignment is ex post efficient, it follows
that the RSD assignment is SD-efficient.
We now assume that there exists an ex post assignment that is not SD-
efficient (1). By Lemma 3, the RSD assignment is a proper convex combination
of all Pareto optimal deterministic assignments (2). By (1) and (2), it follows
from Lemma 2, that the RSD assignment is not SD-efficient.
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